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1. Introduction 
This paper focuses on the relationship between innovation and stock market returns, and investigates 
it through a model depicting innovation as an ambiguous decision. Firms that are more R&D 
intensive are characterized by a higher degree of idiosyncratic risk: the price of their stocks may 
decline due to an event that specifically affects the firm but not the market as a whole. The more 
radical the innovative process, the stronger the uncertainty of expected future profits: breakthrough 
innovation is characterized by Knightian uncertainty (Knight, 1921) or ambiguity, because no 
distribution of probability can be associated with the success of the investment in R&D. Investing in 
radical innovation creates both favourable expectations for its future growth and fears that the 
investment will lead to a “dry hole”. Since people prefer to act on known rather than unknown or 
vague probabilities (Ellsberg, 1961; Epstein and Wang, 1994), models relying on the Bayesian 
paradigm (i.e. on the assumption that a probability measure can represent the likelihood of events 
adequately) are contradicted by evidence and unable to predict behavior in contexts where 
information is uncertain.  
Insofar, scholars have explained a firm’s innovative attitude with its dimension and/or the 
intensity of market competition (Mazzucato, 2006). However, investing in innovation strongly 
affects the firm’s stock value: the entrepreneur who wants to push the value of his firm upwards 
should enhance the firm’s chances of future success, and being innovative is the main way to reach 
this goal. As asset pricing is a function of the stochastic discount factor incorporating firm level risk, 
the revenues of highly innovative firms should be higher than that of non-innovative firms’.  
Managers and business strategists seem to be well-aware of this relationship. For instance, 
Forbes publishes every year a list of the most innovative companies by calculating the “innovation 
premium” as the proportion of a company’s market value that cannot be accounted for from the net 
present value of cash flows of its current products in its current markets: this is the “premium” the 
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stock market gives a company because investors expect it to launch new offerings and enter new 
markets that will generate even bigger income streams. Furthermore, management and strategy 
consulting firms such as Booz & Company have consistently shown over the past years that there is 
no long-term correlation between the amount of money a company spends on its innovation efforts 
and its overall financial performance; instead, what matters is how companies use that money and 
other resources, as well as the quality of their talent, processes, and decision making, i.e. how it deals 
with uncertain outcomes. 
Some previous works (Campbell and Shiller, 1988; Mazzucato and Semmler, 1999; 
Campbell, 2000; Mazzucato, 2003; Mazzucato and Tancioni, 2005; 2012) have emphasized the 
existence of a link between the degree of innovative disruptiveness and the volatility of stock returns 
at the firm level. So far, very few theoretical studies have been devoted to the relationship between 
innovation and stock returns. We introduce a model that summarizes the key mechanisms behind this 
link and that emphasizes the prominent role of ambiguity in affecting the decisions related to radical 
innovation and the consequences of agents’ ambiguity-aversion. The model compares the α-maxmin 
preferences introduced by Ghirardato et al. (2004) to Choquet expected utility in Schmeidler 
(1989)’s formulation. We also show that smoother ambiguity-aversion à la Klibanoff et al. (2005) in 
this specific case falls into the limiting case of α-maxmin preferences.  
In the model, the introduction of a disruptive innovation is captured by allowing the firm to 
use a radically new input the cost of which is sunk and the returns of which are ambiguous: the aim 
is to disentangle the economic forces determining the stochastic discount factor that represents the 
reward that investors demand for bearing ambiguity. 
The results show that the more a firm is innovative, the higher the idiosyncratic ambiguity 
level and the higher the stochastic discount factor. Furthermore, while risk attitude plays no role, the 
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specific form of ambiguity strongly shapes the results. Finally, introducing endogenous innovation 
does not affect the results. 
 
2. Related literature 
Radical breakthroughs are leading forces in driving long-run growth of modern economies. The 
“radical” and “incremental” labels belong mostly to the managerial literature and fail to offer 
univocal description of the difference between the two concepts (Battaggion and Grieco, 2009). 
Although the use of a strict dichotomy could be questionable, scholars agree on the fact that radical 
innovation has the potential to push the technological frontier of a firm or even sector and may allow 
a firm to enter new markets (Beck at al., 2016). Thus, a radical innovation is a product, process, or 
service that embodies a new technology that results in a new market infrastructure (Garcia and 
Calantone, 2002) offering “significant improvements in performance or cost that transform existing 
markets or create new ones” (Leifer et al. 2001). 
This paper concentrates on the uncertain nature of radical innovations. A radical innovation is 
a unique event that cannot be interpreted within a group of instances or in the light of similar 
occurrences (Knight, 1921): thus, it can be considered a good example of “Knightian uncertainty” or 
“ambiguity” that may end up as a market revolution but also as a dramatic and costly failure. 
Foreseeing the probability of success on the basis of R&D expenditure levels is a task that “can only 
partially be addressed by past data” (Athanassoglou et al., 2012).  Uncertainty derives from several 
factors, such as the type of processed knowledge (e.g. Dewar and Dutton, 1986; Henderson, 1993), 
the  interaction between firm-specific capabilities and institutions (e.g. Nord and Tucker, 1987) in 
determining the outcome, the difficulty to anticipate consumers’ reactions and to figure out the 
eventual opening up of a new market and consequent applications (e.g. Henderson and Clark, 1990; 
O'Connor, 1998). Decision makers are typically disturbed by ambiguous situations, and the empirical 
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evidence shows pervasive ambiguity-aversion (e.g. Ellsberg, 1961; Sarin and Weber,1993; Chesson 
and Viscousi, 2003; Gilboa, 2004), although more recent works question that its occurrence is 
systematic and relate it to specific contexts (e.g. Trautmann et al., 2008; Butler et al., 2011).  
As for radical innovations, in the asset price context decisions are affected by substantial 
uncertainty: the structure of the aggregate dividends process is vague for naïf investors but also for 
expert analysts who have the benefit of hindsight. Both the experimental and the market evidence 
(Camerer and Weber, 1992) shows that agents perceive ambiguity differently from risk. Therefore, 
the Bayesian approach needs to be extended, as in Epstein and Wang (1994): investors cannot 
estimate reliable probabilities of gains and make a good calculation of expected values. If we account 
for ambiguity attitudes, investing in radical innovation is not only a consequence of evaluations on 
performance and costs, but might be dramatically affected by cognitive burdens. Managerial 
enquiries testify that ambiguity-aversion, together with inertia and compartmentalized thinking, may 
constitute a learning barrier to the development of drastically new paths: firms tend to proceed as 
they always did, preserving the status quo rather than capitalizing on market information (Adams et 
al., 1998). Still, radical innovation occurs, and innovators with accumulated experience have been 
shown to be more efficient in searching and combining knowledge components (Fleming, 2001). 
Interest in radical innovations is due not only to firm perspectives on  profits and market 
share, but also to the importance in determining the dynamic of expected long-run growth. Stock 
prices reflect these expectations, in general based on fundamentals, but also affected by irrational 
exuberance, bandwagon phenomena, herd behaviours, and over-reactions. Mazzucato (2006) reviews 
the main results on the empirical relationship between innovation and the volatility of stock returns, 
and observes that “there is a missing link between the industrial economics literature on innovation 
and uncertainty and the finance literature on risk and the volatility of stock prices”. There are, 
however, various studies that focus on the effect of innovation on the level of stock prices. Jovanovic 
and MacDonald (1994) relate the evolution of the average industry stock price level to the current 
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stage of the industry life-cycle: they claim that the average stock price falls just before the shakeout 
occurs because a disruptive innovation causes a sudden drop in present product price, which is 
detrimental for incumbents. Jovanovic and Greenwood (1999) link stock prices to innovation in a 
model where innovation causes new capital to destroy old capital: since it is incumbents who are 
quoted on the stock market, innovations by new firms determine an immediate decline in the stock 
market because investors with perfect foresight anticipate this damage to old capital. Proxying 
innovative input with patents, Pakes (1985) shows that unexpected changes in patents and in R&D 
are associated with relevant changes in the market value of the firm, although in the presence of large 
variance that may reflect an extremely dispersed distribution of the values of patented ideas.  
In general, the empirical evidence shows a relationship between stock prices and successful 
innovation having a positive impact on a firm’s profits and growth, consistent with the idea that 
stock prices reflect expectations about discounted future profits. Furthermore, in phases 
characterized by radical innovation, firms that are seen as both probable winners and losers will 
experience volatility in their stock prices (Pastor and Veronesi, 2006). Uncertainty about a firm’s 
average future profitability, which can be thought as uncertainty about the average future growth rate 
of a firm’s book value, increases a firm’s fundamental value (Pastor and Veronesi, 2003). This is 
because innovation often causes a shake-up of market shares, diminishing the power of the 
incumbents who have an incentive to preserve the status quo. In this situation, current performance is 
not a good indicator of future performance: investors are more likely to be influenced by the 
speculation of other investors, leading to high volatility (Campbell and Shiller, 1981).  
 
3. The model 
The model is grounded on Romer’s (1994) and Aizenman’s (1997) neo-Schumpeterian models of 
growth in their closed-economy version, enriched by assumptions on agents' ambiguity attitude. We 
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consider two different specifications of preferences in the case of ambiguity: the former reflects 
Ghirardato et al. (2004)’s expected utility definition, the latter Choquet’s (1955) one - in 
Schmeidler’s (1989) formulation.  
Neo-Schumpeterian models explicitly allow for an introduction into an economy of new or 
improved types of goods: their peculiarity consists of taking explicit account of the fixed costs that 
limit the set of goods and of showing that these fixed costs matter in a dynamic analysis conducted at 
the level of the economy as a whole. This contrasts with the standard approach in general 
equilibrium analysis, in which fixed costs are assumed to be of negligible importance in markets. 
Models of endogenous growth theory differ from the models in Romer (1986, 1987, 1990) and Lucas 
(1988), which emphasize external increasing returns, and from the models in Jones and Manuelli 
(1990) and Rebelo (1991), which are grounded on perfect competition and assume that capital can be 
accumulated forever without driving its marginal product to zero; both the external effects and 
perfect competition models of endogenous growth assume that new goods do not matter at the 
aggregate level. Furthermore, new growth models also depart from the literature on industrial 
organization because they do not capture explicitly the strategic interaction emerging when there is 
only a small number of firms in a market. 
The crucial premise in neo-Schumpeterian models is that every economy faces virtually 
unlimited possibilities for the introduction of new goods, where the term "good" is used in the 
broadest possible sense: it might represent an entirely new type of physical good, or a quality 
improvement; it might be used as a consumption good, or as an input in production. Here, the 
introduction of a new capital good represents an innovation. 
The firm goes through two periods: in period 0, it decides whether to innovate or not, and (if 
it is the case) sustains the sunk costs needed for a breakthrough innovation; in period 1, production 
takes place. We consider an innovating firm that produces a final good Z by using labor L and N 
capital goods xi according to the following production function: 
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 𝑍𝑍 = (𝐿𝐿)1−𝛽𝛽 ∑ (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝛽𝛽𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1          (1) 
 
with 0 < 𝛽𝛽 < 1. Labor’s share of total income is 1 − 𝛽𝛽 and, in the aggregate, the share of all capital 
goods is 𝛽𝛽. The equation follows the Dixit and Stiglitz’s (1977) and Ethier’s (1982) specification of 
constant elasticity aggregator of the capital goods xi, with the elasticity of substitution among the 
various capital goods that is equal to 1
1−𝛽𝛽
. The production of the generic capital good xi takes place 
using the services of labor according to the function 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 where Li stands for the labor in activity i 
aimed at producing capital good xi, while L is the labor employed in production of the final good. For 
simplicity, as standard in this literature w is the real wage and represents the marginal cost of 
producing both the capital goods and the final good.  
Among the set of possible capital goods xi, a new capital good xn  can be introduced either as 
a small improvement in the existing technology (incremental innovation) or as a disruptive opening 
up of a new technology (radical innovation). Because capital good xn  is a new kind of capital good 
that is not a perfect substitute for the existing ones (as, in general, all capital goods xi are not perfect 
substitutes for each other), β must be different from 1. Following Romer (1994), we assume that the 
firm has property rights over the invention of capital good xn, thus the firm can charge the simple 
monopoly price for the units of xn used in the economy. The derived demand for xn from a firm that 
produces Z according to the technology specified in (1) is: 
 
𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛) = 𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿1−𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛𝛽𝛽−1          (2) 
 
where 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛) is the price of capital good xn. From this expression, it follows that, no matter what 
level of xn the firm decides to supply, monopoly pricing let it capture only a fraction β of the increase 
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in output that introducing xn induces. For any selected level of xn1, output Z goes up by 𝐿𝐿1−𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛
𝛽𝛽, but 
the firm gets only 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛)𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 = 𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿1−𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛𝛽𝛽. Denoting 𝑝𝑝 = 𝑤𝑤𝛽𝛽, we can rewrite (2) as 
 
(𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛)𝑑𝑑 = 11−𝛽𝛽 𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝          (3) 
 
We assume the firm evaluates projects by applying a risk-free interest rate, denoted by r. 
Therefore, adding capital good xn will lead to profits equal to 
 
𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛(χ) =  χ(p−w)xn1+𝑟𝑟 − 𝑛𝑛 = χ (w)− β1−β1+𝑟𝑟 1−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 𝛽𝛽 21−𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿 − 𝑛𝑛 = χ W1+𝑟𝑟 − 𝑛𝑛    (4) 
 
where = 1−𝛽𝛽
𝛽𝛽
𝛽𝛽
2
1−𝛽𝛽 , 𝛽𝛽′ = 𝛽𝛽
1−𝛽𝛽
  and 𝑊𝑊 = (w)−β′kL.  
 
3.1 Innovation with α-maxmin expected utility 
The most familiar model of choice under uncertainty follows Savage (1954) in assuming that agents 
maximize expected utility according to subjective priors2 (Subjective Expected Utility, henceforth 
SEU): agents are uncertain about payoffs, but there is no uncertainty about the model and the 
probabilities associated with each state of the world are known. This means that agents are not 
equipped to distinguish between risk (known probabilities) and ambiguity (unknown probabilities): 
agents who maximize SEU do not care about ambiguity.  
                                                          
1 Demand for labor is omitted because we focus on demand for capital since innovation occurs through the introduction 
of a new capital good. 
2 The subjective expectations that agents formulate on probabilities are assumed to be “rational”: the assumption of 
rationality per se does not specify the exact expectations that people hold but asserts that agents hold objectively correct 
expectations conditional on the information they possess (Manski, 2004). More on this in footnote 3. 
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As the empirical evidence strongly departs from this hypothesis (e.g. Knox, 2003; Guiso et 
al., 2008 ), we assume preferences that accounts for ambiguity-aversion. This section presents a 
specification of preferences that summarizes a broader spectrum of agents’ behavior traits than SEU, 
i.e. Ghirardato et al. (2004)’s α-Maxmin Expected Utility (henceforth α-MEU). It represents an 
extension of Gilboa-Schmeidler or maximin approach (henceforth MEU, see Gilboa and Schmeidler, 
1989). We will show below that SEU and MEU preferences are encompassed in the specification of 
α-Maxmin Expected Utility.  
If the innovator were a SEU agent, she would assign a uniform distribution to the returns of 
innovation. The only information available is that the project return is bounded between 𝑹𝑹 and 𝑹𝑹, 
where 𝑹𝑹 <  𝑹𝑹�. The expression 𝑹𝑹+𝑹𝑹�
𝟐𝟐
 represents the expected return of the investment in innovation, 
where the probability .assigned to the unsuccessful outcome 𝑹𝑹 is 𝟏𝟏
𝟐𝟐
: an ambiguity-neutral Bayesian 
agent will refer to this expression as the expected return.  
The α-MEU innovator, on the contrary, bears the ambiguity of the returns of each state of the 
world. As emphasized by Ellsberg (1961), agents3 are unable to summarize uncertainty in the form 
of a unique prior distribution. Therefore, they attach an extra cost to invest in a radical innovation 
that might be interpreted as an "ambiguity premium". The parameter α measures their ambiguity 
attitude on the set of logically possible priors: although agents typically exhibit ambiguity-aversion, 
α-MEU preferences account also for ambiguity-seeking behavior.  
The introduction of a new capital good xn by means of a radical innovation requires an "up-
front capacity investment", which is specific to the new capital good, whereas the marginal cost of 
all the current capital goods is equal to w, as anticipated above. Adding capital good xn requires a 
                                                          
3 An expert agent might be capable to formulate subjective distributional probability also in highly uncertain 
environments (Cooke, 1991; O’Hagan et al., 2006), relying on sophisticated techniques such as, for instance, stochastic 
programming (e.g. Keppo and Zwaan, 2011) or the determination of the option value of an innovation (e.g. Siddiqui et 
al., 2007). However, in practice an expert can only make a finite number (and usually a rather small number) of 
statements of belief about a random variable (Garthwaite et al., 2005): even when familiar with probabilities and their 
meaning, experts might face difficulties in assessing a probability value for an event accurately. 
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sunk cost n specific to that good; the innovator commits to its investment at the beginning of period 
0, whereas production takes place in period 1. Future revenues are uncertain due to the fact that the 
new technological trajectory may or may not be successful (and this is not known a priori). For 
simplicity, we normalize the random shock  χ  to be either low  (χ = 1 - δ) or high (χ = 1+ δ), with δ 
≥ 04. SEU agents assume that the probability assigned to both the successful and unsuccessful 
outcomes (𝑅𝑅 and 𝑅𝑅 respectively) is 1/2 and is independent of the degree of ambiguity about the 
innovation outcomes; for α-MEU agents the precise probability of each state is unknown and δ  
represents the range of possible outcomes of the random variable χ: the larger the range of values 
that future revenues might take, the larger the ambiguity level .  
Incremental improvements in the existing technology are assumed to involve no ambiguity in 
the profitability of the technology: in this case, δ = 0 and χ = 1. Therefore, in the presence of 
incremental innovation, both SEU and α-MEU investors evaluate projects by applying the 
ambiguity-free interest rate r . 
Investing in disruptive innovation, on the contrary,  exposes the innovator to ambiguity. 
The α-MEU innovator’s decision rule can be depicted as to maximize an utility index that 
provides a proper weight for the exposure to ambiguity. The procedure we follow consists of 
constructing two statistics. The first is the "worst scenario" wealth, denoted by 𝜋𝜋;  the second is the 
“best scenario” outcome 𝜋𝜋�; α  is the degree of α−maxmin ambiguity-aversion embodied in the 
decision to invest, with 0≤ α ≤ 1. The agent maximizes the following statistics: 
 
 𝑈𝑈 = 𝛼𝛼𝜋𝜋 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝜋𝜋�         (5) 
 
                                                          
4As emphasized in Einhorn and Hogarth (1982),  in ambiguous situations people use an anchoring-and-adjustment 
strategy in which an initial probability is used as the anchor, and adjustments are made for ambiguity. This means that, 
for instance, receiving new information reduces ambiguity because reduces the range of possible outcomes without 
changing the anchor probability.   
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A larger α indicates higher ambiguity-aversion: when α goes to zero, we have the case of a 
ambiguity-seeking agent, who accounts for the best outcome only. When α equals 1, we have the 
case of extreme ambiguity-aversion (MEU preferences, please see below for a more detailed 
description). When α equals 1/2, we have the case of an agent who attributes a uniform prior to the 
two events, i.e. ambiguity-neutral Bayesian as in SEU preferences.  
Investment in a disruptive innovation will be undertaken if it increases the expected utility: 
 
𝛼𝛼 �
(1−𝛿𝛿)𝑊𝑊
1+𝑟𝑟
� + (1 − 𝛼𝛼) �(1+𝛿𝛿)𝑊𝑊
1+𝑟𝑟
� − 𝑛𝑛 > 0       
 
that leads to  𝑛𝑛 < 𝑊𝑊
1+?̃?𝑟
, where (1 + ?̃?𝑟) = 1+𝑟𝑟
1+𝛿𝛿(1−2𝛼𝛼) > 1 + 𝑟𝑟. 
 
Proposition 1.  An agent with α-MEU preferences evaluates projects by applying a SDF denoted by 
?̃?𝑟 such that (1 + ?̃?𝑟) = 1+𝑟𝑟
1+𝛿𝛿(1−2𝛼𝛼). In presence of ambiguity-aversion, an innovative firm’s SDF is 
higher than a conservative firm’s SDF and investment in innovation occurs when the following 
condition holds: < 𝑊𝑊
1+?̃?𝑟
 . 
 
The Stochastic Discount Factor (SDF) is a random variable the realization of which is always 
positive: it generalizes the notion of discount factor to an uncertain world. The immediate 
consequence of Proposition 1 is that the stocks of a firm investing in radical innovation promise 
higher returns than the stocks of a more conservative firm: this occurs in order to pay investors back 
for their capability to bear ambiguity with respect of investments that do not involve ambiguous 
outcomes. The assumption of α-maxmin preferences permits to distinguish between ambiguity and 
ambiguity-aversion: we define δ as the degree of vagueness, i.e. the amount of “objective” ambiguity 
on the possible values the random shock assumes; a further interpretation of δ can be in terms of 
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volatility of stock returns (see the discussion below). On the other hand, the parameter α captures the 
“subjective” attitude towards ambiguity. The second interesting implication regards the effects on 
SDF of ambiguity and ambiguity-aversion. With α-MEU preferences, the SDF rises in ambiguity 
and in ambiguity-aversion: the more innovation is disruptive and “vague” in its returns, the higher 
the SDF; the higher the degree of ambiguity-aversion, the higher the SDF. 
If there is no ambiguity (as in case of incremental innovation), or if investors are ambiguity-
neutral, the SDF is just a constant r that converts future expected payoffs into present value. Thus, 
investment in a radical innovation will be undertaken if: 
 
𝐸𝐸𝑢𝑢(𝜋𝜋 ) = 𝑊𝑊1+𝑟𝑟 − 𝑛𝑛 >  0         (6) 
 
that leads to  𝑛𝑛 < 𝑊𝑊 1+𝑟𝑟. 
 
For SEU agents who do not care about the ambiguous returns of radical innovation, a new capital 
good is introduced only if its sunk cost is lower than the expected profit that must be discounted at a 
rate r: the same condition holds both when the introduction of capital good xn is an improvement of 
the existing technology and when it opens a new technological trajectory. 
 
Proposition 2. With SEU preferences, the investor evaluates projects by applying an ambiguity-free 
SDF denoted by 𝑟𝑟 < 𝑟𝑟�  and invests in innovation when the following condition holds: 𝑛𝑛 < 𝑊𝑊
1+𝑟𝑟
 . 
 
Improving the existent technology and introducing a totally new one makes no difference from the 
SEU decision-maker point of view: stock returns have the same stochastic discount factor, no matter 
how conservative or disruptive is a firm’s strategy. Since SUE preferences reflect the situation of an 
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agent who is unable to distinguish between risk and ambiguity, the parameter δ  is equal to 0 both in 
case of radical and incremental innovation.  
 
On the other hand, MEU preferences represent the case of extreme ambiguity-aversion, where agents 
act as if they take a worst-case assessment of the utility deriving from innovation. The “worst 
scenario” is equal to the expected wealth multiplied by (1 - δ) because it only accounts for to the 
situation where the random shock hits the firm negatively. Equation (5) becomes 𝑈𝑈 = 𝛼𝛼𝜋𝜋  + (1 −
𝛼𝛼)𝐸𝐸𝑢𝑢(𝜋𝜋 ). Thus, investment in a disruptive innovation will be undertaken if: 
 
 𝛼𝛼 (1−𝛿𝛿)𝑊𝑊
1+𝑟𝑟
+ (1 − 𝛼𝛼) 𝑊𝑊
1+𝑟𝑟
− 𝑛𝑛 > 0         
 
that leads to  𝑛𝑛 < 𝑊𝑊
1+?̅?𝑟
, where (1 + ?̅?𝑟) = 1+𝑟𝑟
1−𝛼𝛼𝛿𝛿
> 1 + 𝑟𝑟. 
 
Proposition 3. With MEU preferences, an innovative firm’s SDF is higher than a conservative firm’s 
SDF and is equal to (1 + ?̅?𝑟) = 1+𝑟𝑟
1−𝛼𝛼𝛿𝛿
> 1 + 𝑟𝑟. 
 
A typical critique to Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) model is that it implies extreme ambiguity-
aversion, or even “paranoia” (Epstein and Schneider, 2010). Klibanoff et al. (2005; 2009) present a 
model with smoother ambiguity where agents’ preferences are built such that the agent computes the 
certainty equivalent over all the possible state of nature and takes the minimum. The utility function 
can be solved in two stages: first, the expected utilities are calculated for all the priors in the 
corresponding set and a set of expected utilities is obtained. Second, the distorted expectation 
described above is taken by aggregating a transformation of these expected utilities with respect to 
the second order prior, i.e., the updated belief over the latent state. The transformation of the 
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expected utilities captures the agent’s ambiguity attitude; in particular, if the transformation is 
concave, then the agent is ambiguity-averse while if it is affine then the agent is ambiguity-neutral 
and simply maximizes a subjective expected utility. Since we assume utility to be a linear function of 
profits, ambiguity à la Klibanoff et al. (2005) falls into α-maxmin expected utility. 
The following section describes an alternative form of smooth ambiguity attitude. 
 
3.2 Innovation with Choquet expected utility 
The following paragraph presents an alternative specification where ambiguity implies non-additive 
probabilities. Schmeidler’s (1989) version of Choquet expected utility model differs from Savage’s 
expected utility model in not necessarily assuming probability to be additive: agent’s beliefs are 
represented by a unique but non-additive probability. Schmeidler refers to them as non-additive 
probabilities, and requires them to be positive and monotone with respect to set inclusion. Such 
mathematical entities are also known as “capacities”: the capacity in the model can be interpreted as 
a lower bound on probabilities. 
The agent maximizes the following statistics: 
 
 𝑈𝑈 = 1
2
𝜋𝜋 + �1
2
− 𝛼𝛼�𝜋𝜋�         (7) 
 
where α is the degree of pessimism or underconfidence in the assumed probability distribution. 
Consequently, (1-α) can be interpreted as the degree of confidence.  
When α equals 0, we have the case of ambiguity-neutrality, as in SEU preferences;  when α 
equals ½, we have the case of extreme ambiguity-aversion of MEU preferences. In general, a larger 
α indicates higher ambiguity-aversion in the sense of lower confidence about the assigned 
probabilities, i.e. on the correctness of the model.  
Investment in radical innovation will be undertaken if it increases the expected utility: 
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1
2
�
(1−𝛿𝛿)𝑊𝑊
1+𝑟𝑟
� + (1
2
− 𝛼𝛼) �(1+𝛿𝛿)𝑊𝑊
1+𝑟𝑟
� − 𝑛𝑛 > 0    (8) 
 
that leads to 𝑛𝑛 < 𝑊𝑊
1+?̂?𝑟
 where (1 + ?̂?𝑟) = 1+𝑟𝑟
1−𝛼𝛼(1+𝛿𝛿). 
 
Having either ambiguity or ambiguity-aversion equal to zero leads to SEU preferences. It is the 
interaction between ambiguity and ambiguity-aversion that determines the SDF, but underconfidence 
in the model matters per se. 
When α=1 (extreme pessimism), the SDF is negative: an investor should be paid to invest, 
and we have the extreme case of no trading. In general, a positive discount factor and consequently 
trade are possible if  𝛿𝛿 < 1
𝛼𝛼
− 1 , i.e. when the degree of ambiguity is not too large with respect to the 
amount of ambiguity that agents are able to tolerate. 
In this framework, the impact of perceived ambiguity on the expected returns from innovation 
expresses the nature and intensity of the psychological bias revealed by decision makers under 
ambiguity that might be called α-ignorance. 
 
Proposition 4. With Choquet ambiguity-averse agents, an innovative firm’s SDF is higher than a 
conservative firm’s SDF; the lower the degree of confidence, the higher the SDF.  
 
The SDF increases in the degree of pessimism in the correctness of the model (1-α); in case of 
extreme optimism, the SDF turns to the SDF we get in the case of SEU preferences. Interestingly, in 
case of Choquet preferences, the SDF is higher than SDF with SEU preferences also in the presence 
of incremental innovation, i.e. with unambiguous investment. 
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The last proposition emphasizes two key findings: first, innovators who appear very confident in 
their knowledge of a new technology do not apply a hurdle rate when discounting objectively 
ambiguous profits. Second, when investors feel extremely optimistic in their knowledge of the 
model, there is no need of compensation for an ambiguous investments and there could be no 
difference in stock revenues of high innovative and conservative firms. 
Some previous versions of Choquet expected utility involve distorting probability measures: 
if the distortion function is concave, then the least favorable events receive increased weight and the 
most favorable events are discounted, reflecting pessimism. Thus, instead of the uniform weighting 
implicit in the expected utility criterion and in this version of Choquet preferences, other models 
accentuate the weight of the least favourable events and reduce the weight assigned to the most 
favorable events or, alternatively, exaggerate the likelihood of the more favorable events and 
downplay the likelihood of the worst outcomes. 
 
4. Effects of risk aversion  
This section removes the assumption of  the decision maker’s risk neutrality and reconsiders the 
ambiguity models introduced above in this perspective.  
Let 𝑢𝑢 ≥ 0 the utility function: we assume that u is C2, 𝑢𝑢′ > 0 and 𝑢𝑢′′ ≤ 0. It is straightforward to 
show that, with SEU preferences, the agent invests in innovation when 𝑛𝑛 <  𝑢𝑢 � 𝑊𝑊
1+𝑟𝑟
� < 𝑊𝑊
1+𝑟𝑟
, i.e., with 
respect to the case of risk neutrality, he needs to face a lower cost to decide to invest. 
With α-MEU preferences, investment in a disruptive innovation will be undertaken if  
𝛼𝛼[(1 − 𝛿𝛿)  𝑢𝑢 � 𝑊𝑊
1+𝑟𝑟
�] + (1 − 𝛼𝛼)[(1 + 𝛿𝛿)𝑢𝑢 � 𝑊𝑊
1+𝑟𝑟
�] − 𝑛𝑛 > 0      
that leads to  𝑛𝑛 < 𝑊𝑊
1+𝑟𝑟′�
, where (1 + ?̃?𝑟′) = 1+𝑟𝑟′
1+𝛿𝛿(1−2𝛼𝛼) > 1 + 𝑟𝑟′. 
With Choquet preferences, the agent invests if 
 1
2
�(1 − 𝛿𝛿)𝑢𝑢 � 𝑊𝑊
1+𝑟𝑟
�� + (1
2
− 𝛼𝛼) �(1 + 𝛿𝛿)𝑢𝑢 � 𝑊𝑊
1+𝑟𝑟
�� > 0     
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that leads to 𝑛𝑛 < 𝑊𝑊
1+?̂?𝑟′
 where (1 + ?̂?𝑟′) = 1+𝑟𝑟′
1−𝛼𝛼(1+𝛿𝛿). 
 
Proposition 5. Propositions 1-4 hold for risk averse agents too, and risk attitude does not affect the 
agents’ behaviour.  
 
This finding is in line with Dow and Werlang (1992a). They show that, in the case of Knightian 
uncertainty, there is an interval of prices within which the agent neither buy nor sell the asset: the 
interval is bounded by two reservation prices that depend only on the beliefs and on uncertainty 
aversion, and not on attitude toward risk. In a similar vein, Veronesi (2000) shows that, in the 
presence of noisy information signals on future dividends, the upper bound to the equity premium is 
not affected by risk aversion: this make the equity premium puzzle even more difficult to explain, 
since assuming a high degree of risk aversion is not enough to explain actual equity premia.  
 
5. An extension: introducing endogenous innovation 
In the previous sections we have left apart any description on how the capital goods xn is produced. 
In this section, a Research & Development technology for inventing the new good is specified. 
Different ways of doing this are illustrated by Romer (1990), Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991), and 
Grossman and Helpman (1991). Introducing an R&D sector allows us to account also for the fact 
that technological change is typically endogenous, in the sense that it arises from intentional 
investment decisions made by profit-maximizing agents, although the relationship between the 
amount of money a company spends on its innovation efforts and its performance is highly 
imperfect5. Final output Z is now expressed as a function of labor L, physical capital disaggregated 
into an finite number N of distinct types of capital goods xi, and human capital H. In this 
                                                          
5 Gambardella (1995) compares the “random search” phase with the “guided search” phase of the pharmaceutical 
industry, and provides some insight on why there may be less uncertainty associated with high innovation. 
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environment, a simple functional form for output is the following version of the Cobb-Douglas 
production function: 
 
𝑍𝑍 = 𝐻𝐻𝛾𝛾(𝐿𝐿)1−𝛽𝛽 ∑ (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝛽𝛽−𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1          (9) 
 
where γ  represents the share of total income that is attributable to human capital (with 0 < γ < 1 and 
β > γ ). Once the firm R&D lab has produced a design for capital good xn, it can obtain an infinitely 
lived patent on that design.  
Demand for xn is derived following the same steps shown in Section 3: 
 
(𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛)𝑑𝑑 = �𝛽𝛽−𝛾𝛾𝑝𝑝 � 11+𝛾𝛾−𝛽𝛽 𝐻𝐻 𝛾𝛾1+𝛾𝛾−𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿 1−𝛽𝛽1+𝛾𝛾−𝛽𝛽       (10) 
 
Adding capital good xn will lead to profits equal to 
 
𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛(χ) =  χ(p−w)xn1+𝑟𝑟 − 𝑛𝑛 = χ (w)− γ−β1+γ−β1+𝑟𝑟 1−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 𝛽𝛽 11+𝛾𝛾−𝛽𝛽𝐻𝐻 𝛾𝛾1+𝛾𝛾−𝛽𝛽 𝐿𝐿 1−𝛽𝛽1+𝛾𝛾−𝛽𝛽 − 𝑛𝑛 = χ 𝑊𝑊�1+𝑟𝑟 − 𝑛𝑛    (11) 
 
where k� = 1−𝛽𝛽
𝛽𝛽
𝛽𝛽
1
1+𝛾𝛾−𝛽𝛽 , β�′ = − γ−β
1+γ−β
  , 𝜌𝜌 = 𝛾𝛾
1+𝛾𝛾−𝛽𝛽
 and 𝑊𝑊� = (w)−β�′k�H𝜌𝜌L1−𝜌𝜌. Since 𝜕𝜕𝑊𝑊�
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
> 0, the 
SDF increases in H and in 𝛾𝛾, suggesting that stronger effort in R&D and higher R&D productivity 
have a positive impact on stock returns. Furthermore, the specification of preferences does not affect 
this result, as in the case of exogenous innovation. In fact, propositions 1-4 hold with W replaced by 
𝑊𝑊� . 
 
Proposition 6. Propositions 1-4 hold for endogenous innovation too, and the endogeneity of 
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innovation does not affect the agents’ behavior.  
 
6. Comparison among ambiguity models 
The sections above presented two alternative models of decision making that allow for non-neutral 
approaches to ambiguity. The question is now how should we select the model to work with when 
investigating the relationship between stock returns and firm innovativeness. As emphasized by 
Gilboa and Marinacci (2011), there are alternative approaches to this problem. First, one may 
compare the different models by a “horse-race”: the model that best explains the observed 
phenomenon should be used for prediction. Alternatively, in the light of the theoretical difficulties in 
selecting a specific model, one may try to obtain general conclusions within a class of models, 
without committing to a particular theory of decision making. This approach has been suggested in 
the context of risk by Machina (1982). In his well-known paper, Machina has shown that, for some 
applications, economists need not worry about how people really make decisions, since a wide range 
of models are compatible with particular qualitative conclusions. A similar way of proceeding has 
been suggested for decisions under uncertainty. An example of this approach is the notion of 
biseparable preferences, as in Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002): biseparable preferences assume 
smoothness and monotonicity and include both α-maxmin and Choquet preferences. Ghirardato and 
Marinacci (2001) provide a definition of ambiguity-aversion that does not depend on the specific 
model of decision making and applies to all biseparable preferences. This allows for a general 
approach to preferences under ambiguity which, similarly to Machina (1982), remains silent 
regarding the actual structure of preferences, thereby offering a highly flexible model. In this 
perspective, α-maxmin preferences have been shown to be general enough to encompass both the 
case of ambiguity-neutrality and maximum ambiguity-aversion, and allow for an interpretation in 
terms of confidence in the decision model. Furthermore, they are compatible also with an ambiguity-
seeking attitude: as summarized in Section 2, the empirical evidence shows that, in several situations 
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and contexts, decision makers do seek ambiguity. In the case of disruptive firms, positive 
announcements on perspective profits, such as news on financial results and sales, might be 
interpreted as signals for success in radical innovation and cause investors to reduce ambiguity-
aversion and increase the demand for stocks. When capturing stock price reactions, a Choquet  
Expected  Utility has the advantage of accounting also for investors’ inertia: in the case of extreme 
pessimism on own capability to understand how financial markets work, such as, for instanc,e in the 
worst moments of a financial crisis, no SDF, although high, is able to stimulate investment. 
Assuming α-maxmin preferences, on the contrary, emphasizes the agents’ tendency to choose acts 
where they do not end up bearing ambiguity. 
When discussing theoretical and empirical identification, another possibility is including 
second moments in the analysis: in ambiguous situations, subjective probability distributions will in 
general differ from actual distributions, and so the variance bound can be violated in a probabilistic 
sense, leading to excess volatility. The finance literature shows that there is a link between stock 
market returns and volatility, where more uncertain (i.e. more volatile) assets generally show the 
highest returns. The few studies that analyze stock price dynamics and innovation jointly relate the 
latter to the changes in the stock price level or in volatility of stock prices (e.g. Jovanovic and 
MacDonald, 1994; Schiller, 2000) and are mainly concerned with aggregate innovation dynamics. 
On the contrary, Mazzucato and Tancioni (2008) provide some firm-level evidence on the relation 
between  the dynamics of uncertainty and innovation specific characteristics, and empirically 
establish a positive and contemporaneous relationship between idiosyncratic risk and innovation 
intensity, although without controlling for the disruptiveness of innovation. When agents’ 
preferences satisfy Savage’s (1954) axiom, it is natural to assume that they update according to 
Bayes rule: updating under uncertainty occurs under the Demspter-Shafer rule and implies higher 
volatility (Dow and Welang, 1992b). According to Cambell et al. (2000), high volatility is often 
associated with lower explanatory power of the market model for a typical stock and might be 
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captured by the case of underconfidence in Choquet specification. Furthermore, with underconfident 
agents, Choquet preferences imply higher SDF than SEU preferences also in the absence of 
volatility: an interesting way of comparing the effectiveness of the two models could be testing 
whether SDF of innovative firms are higher than SDF of conservative firms in period of low 
volatility. 
 
7. Discussion and conclusions 
There is overall agreement that radical innovation is important (e.g. Leifer et al., 2001): consensus 
has emerged that conventional incremental improvements and cost reduction strategies are 
insufficient for obtaining a competitive advantage (Sorescu et al., 2003) as a direct consequence of 
worldwide diffusion of knowledge and industrial capability. Understanding radical innovation may 
eventually make their course shorter, less sporadic, less expensive. Furthermore, understanding 
radical innovation may shed light on stock market prices both in terms of level and volatility. The 
empirical evidence shows that firm innovativeness is positively related to firm value as measured by 
stock returns. This is due to the compensation that investors need to get when bearing the ambiguity 
involved in radical innovation. Ambiguity characterizes radical innovations as opposed to 
incremental innovations, where only measurable uncertainty is involved. 
The paper presents a neo-Schumpeterian model that accounts for the introduction of new 
goods and captures the related sunk costs. The crucial hypotheses we introduce are that (a) radical 
innovation is an ambiguous decision, and (b) investors are ambiguity-averse. We suggest two 
possible ways of capturing ambiguity. The first, based on Ghirardato et al.’s (2004) approach, 
presents smooth ambiguity and allows for both ambiguity seeking and ambiguity-aversion behaviour 
too; the second, based on Schmeidler’s (1989) version of Choquet’s notion of capacity, interprets 
ambiguity-aversion as underconfidence on the correctness of the model the decision makers use to 
interpret the real world. Results are robust to differences in risk attitudes and to the introduction of  
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endogenous innovation, and show that it is ambiguity-aversion that makes the difference between 
radical and incremental innovation so crucial: if agents were ambiguity-neutral, then radical 
innovation would not bring about higher stock prices than incremental innovation. In the presence of 
ambiguity, modelled as a larger set of possible priors, firms will be more willing to invest in 
incremental innovation rather than bet on investing on more disruptive ones, and investors should be 
compensated for their investment in stocks the returns of which are ambiguous. In a Subjective 
Expected Utility model, the firm’s probability of being successful in introducing a radical innovation 
would be known, and the investor would switch, at a certain price, from demanding this firm’s stocks 
to offering them. This is no longer the case when the probability of success is unknown. In this 
situation, in presence of ambiguity-averse investors, there will be an interval of prices at which 
neither buying nor selling will seem attractive, and an ambiguity-averse agent will choose to hold an 
unambiguous portfolio of stocks of a more conservative firm. In particular, an agent who is 
maximally ambiguity-averse will always choose to hold an unambiguous portfolio, no matter the 
relative prices of stocks. By contrast, an agent who maximizes expected utility with respect to a 
subjective prior will choose to hold equal quantities of two stocks only if the ratio of prices is equal 
to the ratio of subjective probabilities.  
This may explain both why people refrain from trading in certain markets, and why 
entrepreneurs exhibit inertial behavior with respect of engaging in the exploration of new 
technologies. It can also explain why, at times of higher volatility, one may observe lower volumes 
of trade: with a larger set of probabilities that are considered possible, there will be more investors 
who decide neither to buy nor to sell. 
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